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Takatoshi Ito and Anne 0. Krueger 
One of the hallmarks of the 1990s has been the enormous increase in the 
international flow of long-term private capital. The architects of the post- 
war economic system (the Bretton Woods system) based their plans on 
the assumptions that private capital markets had been almost entirely de- 
stroyed by the upheavals of the Great Depression and that, in the future, 
most capital flows would consist either of  short-term trade credits or of 
official flows. Over the intervening forty years, private capital flows gradu- 
ally reemerged, first among the industrialized countries and then among 
most of the countries of the world. By  the 1980s, some developing coun- 
tries were relying more on private capital flows than on official flows, and 
by  the  1990s, private capital flows  had  dwarfed official flows  for most 
countries. 
Different components of  private capital flows grew at different rates. 
Among them, many observers focused on foreign direct investment (FDI) 
as an important contributor to growth. According to the International 
Monetary Fund (1998), FDI to developing countries rose steadily from 
US$18 billion in  1990 to $138 billion in  1997. Even in the wake of  the 
currency crises of  1994-95  in Mexico and 1997-98  in Asia, FDI has been 
credited for its stability relative to other forms of capital flows. 
Interestingly,  in  the  1950s  and  1960s,  few  developing  countries  at- 
tempted to attract private foreign capital. What efforts there were usually 
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were intended to attract investment into “import substitution” industries. 
Indeed, in many countries private foreign capital was subject to strong 
political attacks for being an instrument of “exploitative” Western capital- 
ism. When that attitude changed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, policy- 
makers in many of the same countries sought private foreign capital. In a 
complete reversal, by the mid-l990s, many policymakers came to regard 
private foreign  capital,  and  especially  FDI, as a  major  and  essential 
source, if not the key source, for accelerating economic growth. 
Asian countries have had varying experiences with private foreign capi- 
tal. Taiwan and Singapore sought private foreign capital early in their de- 
velopment efforts at a time when few other countries did so. Japan and 
Korea received little equity capital (FDI or portfolio) during their years 
of rapid development, although Korea accessed commercial banks to a 
considerable extent. Countries of Southeast Asia began encouraging FDI 
by the 197Os, as they began their rapid outward-oriented development ef- 
fort. Later on, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan became exporters of private cap- 
ital to other countries, although there were substantial inflows as well as 
outflows. The Southeast Asian countries have continued to be predomi- 
nantly recipients of inflows, especially from the East Asian countries. 
International economists have long taught that a negative current ac- 
count balance is the counterpart to capital flows and enables a country to 
invest more than it saves. This truism led most economists to believe that 
net capital flows were in the interests of both capital exporters and capital 
importers. Until recent years when private capital flows increased, how- 
ever, little attention was paid to their causes and effects, and to differences 
between types of capital flows. 
However, at the same time as private capital flows had greatly increased 
in importance, financial crises in countries such as Mexico, and later in 
Asia, raised concern about the stability of these flows. In very short pe- 
riods of  time, private capital outflows threatened to overwhelm central 
banks, forcing rapid action and changes in policies on the part of a num- 
ber of governments. 
These recent developments thus raise a number of questions. What is 
the role of private capital (inflows or outflows) in resource allocation and 
in affecting economic growth? What determines the direction and com- 
position of capital flows? What are the contributions of different types of 
capital flows? Researchers have been turning their attention to these issues 
as the importance of private long-term capital flows has increased, and as 
policymakers have attached increasing importance to them. But in fact, 
little is known about these capital flows and their causes and effects. Ques- 
tions arise at many levels-micro-  and macroeconomic determinants and 
effects of capital flows in general and of different types of capital flows. 
For that reason, and also because capital flows are so important to 
countries in East Asia, the ninth annual NBER-East  Asia Seminar on Introduction  3 
Economics (EASE) focused on FDI in and from East Asian countries and 
its microeconomic determinants and effects. FDI plays a number of roles 
in different countries. For Japan, FDI has mostly been directed outward; 
about one-quarter of it has been directed to other Asian countries. Korea, 
Taiwan, and to a lesser extent Singapore and Hong Kong have both in- 
ward  and outward  FDI flows. In the early years of  their  phenomenal 
growth, inward  FDI predominated;  more recently, outward investment 
has taken place as industries earlier established in those places have pur- 
sued cost advantages in countries with lower wage rates for unskilled work- 
ers. In  1996, for example, outward  FDI from Korea and Taiwan was 
US$4.7 billion and $3.8 billion, respectively, while inward FDI was $2.3 
billion and $1.9 billion. Thus “net” FDI amounted to $2.4 billion, or 0.5 
percent of GDP, in Taiwan and $1.4 billion, or 0.7 percent of GDP, in 
Korea. For  still other countries, most notably  in South and Southeast 
Asia, FDI has been mostly inward. 
Economists have long agreed that capital flows, from countries where 
capital per worker is abundant and has a relatively low real rate of return 
to countries where capital per worker is scarcer and has a higher real rate 
of return, could benefit both capital-sending and capital-receiving coun- 
tries. Moreover, in the context of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuel- 
son model of international trade, where comparative advantage derives in 
large part from differences in relative factor endowments, capital flows (in 
the form of current account deficits) to a country can serve as a substitute 
for trade in goods. Thus a relatively capital-poor country could benefit 
either  from exporting  labor-intensive  goods  and  exchanging them  for 
capital-intensive goods or from having a current account deficit to enable 
it to increase its relative stock of capital. 
In either case, the country would obtain a bundle of goods and services 
with larger capital inputs than would be achievable in the absence of trade 
in goods and capital flows. But if “trade in capital” is all that is involved 
in  capital flows, the  form  of  the capital flow  should be  immaterial- 
whether long-term bonds issued in the receiving country, long-term com- 
mercial bank lending, foreign purchase of equities in the local share mar- 
ket, or FDI. In fact, many observers have claimed that these forms of 
capital flow are distinctly different, both in terms of their microeconomic 
impact on the sending and receiving countries and in terms of the degree 
to which they render the receiving economy vulnerable. This latter concern 
has been highlighted by events in Mexico at the end of 1994 and again by 
the Asian crisis of 1997-98.  Many of the issues are macroeconomic as, for 
example, when it is claimed that FDI is less likely to result in financial in- 
stability than is portfolio investment, which can be withdrawn much more 
easily and quickly. 
Many papers investigating the determinants (or early warning indica- 
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point out that a higher ratio of FDI to total flow reduces the probability 
of currency crisis. The reason is thought to be that FDI is a steady flow 
of long-term capital that, once invested, is not likely to be quickly with- 
drawn, while portfolio flows are volatile and foreign investors can quickly 
sell them. It has been debated whether capital controls erected against 
short-term portfolio flows by  developing countries serve the purpose of 
lowering the vulnerability of these countries, but there is a consensus that 
accepting (expanding) FDI normally reduces vulnerability to large shifts 
in flows. 
While issues relating to the macroeconomic effects of different types of 
capital flows are being addressed by many economists and financial ana- 
lysts throughout the world, a prior question relates to the differing effects 
of each of these types of capital flows. Questions arise as to when invest- 
ments will be undertaken and financed by  purchases of equity (as in in- 
stances of acquisitions or simply purchases of shares in the open market), 
by  various forms of long-term lending and borrowing, or by  FDI. If all 
that capital flows do is enable additional investment in the receiving coun- 
try, the form of the capital flow might not matter. Even then, issues relat- 
ing to the volatility of  different types of capital flows might arise. This 
subject is addressed below. 
But observers have suggested that FDI provides people in the recipient 
country  with much more than  simply a larger amount of  capital with 
which to work. One of the early efforts to ascertain what these broader ef- 
fects are was made by Kiyoshi Kojima (1978, esp. chaps. 4 and 7), who sug- 
gested that Japanese FDI and American FDI in Southeast Asia were quite 
different, with the Japanese investing more in  industries that produced 
goods to be used by Japanese industry and Americans investing more in 
industries that produced goods for the home market. 
In recent years, it has often been said that FDI enables managers and 
workers in  the recipient country  to acquire know-how and technology 
faster than would otherwise be possible. It may also enable new entrants 
to learn about export markets, stimulate competition with local firms, and 
provide training for workers. While these ideas have been put forth, many 
questions  remain.  What  is  “technology”? What  attributes  are  “trans- 
ferred” through FDI that could not otherwise be attained by, for example, 
sending students abroad or through  licensing and royalty agreements? 
Even at the theoretical level, a number of questions arise. But there is  a 
dearth of empirical evidence, which could help to shed light on these issues. 
It was to consider how FDI in fact affects host and recipient countries 
at the microeconomic level that the ninth annual EASE was held. Ques- 
tions addressed included: How different are foreign-owned (or joint ven- 
ture) firms from local firms, and in what ways? What are the effects of the 
entrance of foreign firms into a domestic market? Do foreign firms enable 
all firms to achieve mastery of advanced technologies, or are those tech- 
nologies adapted only in foreign-owned local firms? Introduction  5 
The first set of papers examines characteristics of Japanese FDI in Asia. 
Belderbos, Capannelli, and Fukao examine Japanese FDI to Asia in the 
electronics sector, analyzing practices with regard to local procurement 
and technology transfer. Urata and Kawai’s paper covers Japanese FDI to 
the rest of the world in textiles, chemicals, general machinery, electronic 
machinery, and transport equipment to test for effects on intrafirm pro- 
ductivity enhancement and local procurement. Kimura examines Japanese 
FDI to Asia and North America in both manufacturing and nonmanufac- 
turing sectors. His goal is to test whether the industrial sector of a subsid- 
iary is the same as that of its parent. Branstetter examines Japanese FDI 
in the United States in chemicals, machinery, electronics, transportation 
equipment, and precision instruments with a view to seeing whether FDI 
helps innovation in local production. 
Belderbos et al. analyze in chapter  1 the determinants of local content 
for  157 Japanese electronics manufacturing  subsidiaries in  Asia. Local 
content is the sum of in-house value added and local outsourcing and is 
considered to be the component of output that yields benefits to the host 
country via  technology transfers. Belderbos and his coauthors find that 
local content is generally lower in greenfield subsidiaries, subsidiaries of 
R&D-intensive parents, and export-oriented subsidiaries in the ASEAN- 
4 countries and  China. In contrast, local content is  higher  in  export- 
oriented subsidiaries in the newly industrialized economies, those subsidi- 
aries that have higher domestic sales ratios, and subsidiaries of  vertical 
keiretsu firms with strong intra-keiretsu supplier relationships. 
In chapter 2 Urata and Kawai measure technology transfer by compar- 
ing the level of total factor productivity of overseas affiliates with that of 
parent firms. The smaller the gap between the two, they believe, the greater 
the extent of intrafirm technology transfer. Urata and Kawai find that the 
capability to absorb technologies, as reflected in educational attainment 
in host countries, is  a key  explanatory variable for intrafirm technology 
transfer. In some cases, experience in industrial activities is also shown to 
contribute to intrafirm transfers of technology. 
We tend to think that FDI is a locational decision for reproducing pro- 
duction facilities. Kimura points out in chapter 3 that FDI is not necessar- 
ily undertaken in the same industry. Sector switching between parent and 
FDI affiliate is the focus of his study. The research is motivated by  the 
observation that many Japanese trading firms invest in downstream and 
upstream industries abroad. Kimura finds that large Japanese manufactur- 
ing parent firms tend to have  both manufacturing affiliates (all over the 
world) and nonmanufacturing affiliates (mainly in North America and Eu- 
rope). Small manufacturing parent firms concentrate on production activ- 
ities (do less sector switching) at their affiliates, particularly in East Asia. 
Large nonmanufacturing parent firms, such as general trading companies 
(sogo shosha), have extensive networks of production and wholesale trad- 
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such as size, foreign sales, and R&D expenditures, also promote sector 
switching. 
Branstetter examines FDI as a channel for R&D spillovers in chapter 
4. He constructs and uses panel data for individual Japanese firms to mea- 
sure the quantitative impact of FDI on firms’ innovation  activities. He 
asks: How does Japanese FDI enable Japanese firms to acquire knowledge 
in the United States? To  answer this question, he regresses “innovation” 
(as measured by the number of U.S. patents owned by a firm) on the firm’s 
own R&D expenditures, foreign spillovers (measured by  R&D expendi- 
tures by  technologically related U.S. firms), and foreign spillovers times 
FDI (greenfield investments in the United States). The coefficient on the 
interaction of FDI  with foreign spillovers is significantly  positive, and Bran- 
stetter concludes that Japanese firms with FDI  in the United States experi- 
ence higher productivity from those spillovers than firms without FDI. 
The first four chapters center on Japanese FDI; another interesting issue 
is contrasts between Japanese and American FDI in the Southeast Asian 
region. Lipsey addresses that subject in chapter 5. He notes that the com- 
position of exports has changed markedly in East Asian countries, mov- 
ing away from the “typical  developing country” composition of labor- 
intensive commodities toward one more like that in advanced countries. 
U.S. FDI is found to have played an important part in this shift because 
it was directed largely toward  the newer group of export industries. As 
experience with exports in the new industries was gained, U.S. firms re- 
duced their concentration on exportable production and tended to pro- 
duce more for home markets. Lipsey finds that Japanese firms invested 
in industries that had already demonstrated comparative advantage and 
exported. However, he also finds that over time U.S. and Japanese affiliates 
have become more alike. 
In chapter 6 Abe and Zhao build a theoretical model to consider the 
benefits and costs of customs union between developed and developing 
countries. They derive conditions for a profit-increasing (for the firm) cus- 
toms union and show the policy implications of developing countries’ use 
of subsidies to promote joint ventures. These subsidies work in the same 
way as a reduction in tariffs on intermediate goods and can, under their 
assumptions, improve welfare. 
In chapter 7 Cheng and Kwan consider the determinants of FDI in 
China, using data from twenty-nine Chinese regions for the period 1986- 
95. They attempt to distinguish between the agglomeration effect (under 
which new investment follows old investment to the same destinations) 
and other factors (such as wage levels) that influence choice of location 
for foreign investors. They find that both sets of factors are important. 
Investors are more likely to flock to a location where others have already 
gone. However, other factors can offset this tendency. They find that good 
infrastructure, for example, attracts FDI and that higher wage costs deter Introduction  7 
FDI. Measures to encourage FDI (such as those taken in China’s Special 
Economic Zones) have had large positive effects, while other measures to 
attract FDT have had smaller, but still positive effects. 
Another interesting question pertains to the determinants of the overall 
level of FDI directed to China, as contrasted with other emerging markets. 
In chapter  8 Wei  addresses this question.  He first notes the very large 
absolute value of investment in China but then points out that a sizable 
part originates in Hong Kong. He argues that this is “false” foreign invest- 
ment because it is investment by mainland Chinese who send their capital 
to Hong Kong to receive the benefits accorded to foreign investors. Once 
investment from Hong Kong is netted out, Wei uses a cross-country model 
to examine the extent to which FDI in  China is the same as for other 
emerging markets. He finds that China is a “significant  underachiever,” 
given its size and other attributes, relative to other countries. He also finds 
that corruption within China is a major deterrent and can explain a sig- 
nificant portion of the shortfall in foreign investment. In addition, he be- 
lieves that the regulatory burden in China may weigh heavily on the FDI 
decision. 
Korea has also had an interesting experience with foreign investment. 
In chapter 9 June-Dong Kim and Sang-in Hwang investigate the effect of 
inward FDI on the productivity of Korean industries and also the effect 
on the likelihood of currency crisis. They find that FDI in Korean manu- 
facturing sectors had a positive, but statistically insignificant, effect on the 
productivity of these sectors. In a sample of ninety developing countries 
in the 199Os, they found that FDI inflows lower the incidence of both cur- 
rency crashes and IMF rescue loans. The explanation, they believe, is that 
FDI is less mobile than short-term portfolio flows so countries with higher 
FDI ratios are better  able to withstand adverse macroeconomic  shocks 
than countries with relatively less FDI. 
In chapter  10 Seungjin Kim also considers Korean FDI but analyzes 
the impact of outward FDI from Korea. Some observers have feared that 
investing  overseas  may  drain  home firms  of  investment  resources  that 
could otherwise be used to increase productivity in Korea. However, Kim 
finds no evidence of any such effects and notes that the relatively small 
size of Korean FDI, combined  with  the access of  Korean firms to the 
international capital market, probably implied that FDI occurred in addi- 
tion to home investment and was not a substitute for it. 
For Taiwan, Chen and Ku analyze in chapter 11 the effects of FDI by 
examining the microeconomic aspects of FDI in one industry: Taiwanese 
textiles. They study the pattern of change at the level of individual firms 
over the years 1992-95.  During that period, extensive restructuring of the 
industry was going on, much of it entailing large investments. Most firms 
reduced the number of product lines in which they engaged, even changing 
the principal commodities they produced, so that by  1995 almost half of 8  Takatoshi Ito and Anne 0.  Krueger 
sales revenue came from products introduced after 1992. Firms that had 
undertaken FDI were found to have restructured more dramatically in Tai- 
wan than those that had avoided FDI. 
In chapter 12 Chan analyzes the role of FDI in the growth of Taiwan’s 
manufacturing industries. Controlling for the growth of human capital, 
gross capital formation, and exports in  two-digit manufacturing indus- 
tries, Chan investigates the links between FDI and growth in each manu- 
facturing sector. Pooling time-series and cross-sectional data, Chan finds 
a link between FDI in individual manufacturing sectors and growth but 
no link between FDI and fixed investment or exports. The suggested inter- 
pretation is that FDI’s impact on manufacturing growth probably came 
directly through technological improvements resulting from FDI rather 
than through any indirect channel. 
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